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58 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CASE OF THE TAIL 
WAGGING THE DOG 
Michael Halley*† 
A response to John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009). 
Professor John Manning’s analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent feder-
alism decisions works as a platform to further the cause of textualism. His 
argument fails to persuade, however, because the textualism he says the 
Court should embrace in federalism cases is antithetical to the atextual na-
ture of the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
legislation. Manning prefaces his work by telling readers that his analysis is 
not an end in itself. His aim, rather, is to “use the methodology” the cases 
embrace as “a window into the commonalities, if any, between statutory and 
constitutional interpretation.” But Manning’s overly programmatic approach 
does not so much open this portal as close it shut. His insistence that legisla-
tive acts and the Constitution are alike is impossible to square with the 
theory of our written constitution that has prevailed ever since John Mar-
shall and Alexander Hamilton first propounded it: that the acts of a superior 
must trump those of every inferior authority.  
I. Tethered to the Text 
Manning’s perception of discontinuity between the spirit of the law the 
Court embraces in federalism cases and the Court’s preference for the letter 
of the law in matters of statutory interpretation is something he does not so 
much ponder as categorically denounce. He insists that “if the Court’s justi-
fication for a literal application of statutes is correct,” and Manning clearly 
believes it is, then “there is no meaningful sense in which the constitution-
makers or the constitutionmaking process can be said to have adopted 
federalism in the abstract.” He argues that since statutes and the Constitu-
tion are both the product of lawmakers’ “hard choices about how to carry 
out their purposes,” the “specific meaning” that they manage to convey con-
cretely, and not their abstract “background justification,” must control.  
Manning applies this unified theory not only to conflate statutory and 
constitutional interpretation, but also to condense into one the three com-
monly acknowledged categories of judicial review. Whether examining 
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federalism, separation of powers, or individual rights, Manning explains that 
to abstract the “freestanding” purpose “underlying specific constitutional 
provisions” is to adjudicate at “an unhelpful level of generality, one that 
disregards the specification of means by which its adopters sought to 
achieve such purposes.” Manning’s choice of words here is unfortunate. 
Whether “deriving a generalized right of privacy from various clauses that 
protect that value” to vindicate the right of married people to purchase con-
traceptives in Connecticut was helpful is surely a matter of perspective. 
Manning’s condemnation of Griswold v. Connecticut1 in an article devoted 
to federalism is, moreover, both inapposite and anachronistic. While Man-
ning may not agree with the Griswold decision, surely the right to privacy it 
“embodies” deserves a better hearing than the one sentence Manning allows 
it. Its authority as stare decisis also demands a more thorough treatment.  
Professor Gillian Metzger’s response to Manning is especially applica-
ble in the context of Griswold.2 She asserts that “Manning’s argument is far 
more destabilizing to existing doctrines and long-established practices of 
constitutional interpretation than he acknowledges, which . . . counts sig-
nificantly against it.” In his confirmation hearing on September 13, 2005, 
Chief Justice Roberts felt comfortable discussing Griswold and its result 
because it did not appear “to be an area that is going to come before the 
court again.” He also commented that “[i]t was surprising when it came be-
fore the court in 1965.” Manning should likewise possess both the good 
sense to leave well enough alone and the intellectual honesty to train his 
artillery on the live target of abortion rather than on the dead letter of con-
traception.  
Manning’s assault on every variant of constitutional decision-making 
not strictly tethered to a specific textual provision is impossible to square 
with his claim that he “does not seek to consider whether the new federal-
ism decisions are ultimately ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in some sense, but rather [he 
seeks] to see what light they might shed on the use of purposive abstraction 
in constitutional adjudication.” His repudiation of Griswold and his embrace 
of Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Boumediene v. United States3—in 
which Scalia criticizes the “general ‘separation-of-powers principles’ 
dreamed up by the Court”—reveal that Manning’s across-the-board defense 
of the letter of the law is a normative argument. And as a normative argu-
ment, it implodes. 
II. The Atextual Nature of Judicial Review  
Metzger also observes that “compromise simply cannot shoulder the 
analytic work Manning assigns to it.” This deficiency is symptomatic of a 
much larger and more intractable problem. What Manning calls “constitu-
                                                                                                                      
 1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
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tional interpretation” is a euphemism that allows him to ignore the fact that 
judicial review—the only possible vehicle for constitutional interpretation, 
however pursued or accomplished—is “nowhere defined or even mentioned 
in the [Constitution] itself.”4 Scholarship confirms that judicial review is as 
freestanding a concept as the federalism Manning denounces. As Professor 
Alexander Bickel states at the outset of his rightly celebrated book, The 
Least Dangerous Branch, judicial review “cannot be found” in the Constitu-
tion, but rather it has somehow been placed there. Professor David Strauss 
more recently asserts that even those with the most divergent views on the 
constitution agree that judicial review is an abstract principle that cannot be 
tied to any specific constitutional provision.5 The Founders likewise be-
lieved that judicial review is at best a logical inference. In Cohens v. 
Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall opined that the “judicial power of every 
well constituted government must be coextensive with the legislative, and 
must be capable of deciding every judicial question which grows out of the 
Constitution and laws.”6 Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 80, 
writes that there must “be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to con-
stitutional provisions,” and that “the propriety of the judicial power of a 
government” must be “coextensive with its legislative [power].”  
If, as the weight of authority suggests, judicial review cannot be tied to 
the letter of the Constitution, the logical conclusion of Manning’s argument 
is that judicial review should not exist. And, absent judicial review, any talk 
of constitutional interpretation, to quote Manning quoting Justice Scalia in 
Boumediene, is “nonsensical.” Professor Metzger again hits the mark in ob-
serving that Manning’s argument “boils down to a claim akin to the maxim 
that the specific trumps the general—though for Manning the general ends 
up wholly obliterated.” Manning’s individuated thrusts on the spirit of con-
stitutional interpretation are parried in the aggregate by the determining 
force of judicial review, which—it is no exaggeration to say—floats like a 
butterfly but stings like a bee.  
III. Commonality Debunked 
Manning’s myopia—his inability or unwillingness to see the constitu-
tional forest through the legislative trees in pursuit of “commonalities”—is 
evident throughout his analysis. He fails to distinguish the singular focus of 
statutory interpretation, where only the meaning of a legislative act is at 
issue, from the duality of constitutional interpretation, where an act’s very 
existence hangs in the balance. Judicial review is a high stakes game of “in-
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cluded identity or excluded difference:”7 if the act cannot be incorporated 
within the Constitution, it is deemed repugnant and held void. The core 
principle of judicial review is that the Constitution’s generality trumps a 
statute’s specificity. As Marshall asserted in Marbury v. Madison,8 “[t]he 
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may 
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” “To what pur-
pose,” he asks, “are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation 
committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained?” If legislation excluded by the Constitution does 
not confine the legislature, and if what is proscribed nevertheless “bind[s] 
the courts and oblige[s] them to give it effect,” then the Constitution, “estab-
lished in theory,” would be “overthrow[n] in fact . . . an absurdity too gross 
to be insisted on.”  
The fact that statutory interpretation at times entails the examination of 
multiple statutes only further highlights the fundamental difference between 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. In The Federalist No. 78, Hamil-
ton explains that when two statutes clash and cannot be reconciled, the 
applicable “rule of construction” is that “the last in order of time shall be 
preferred to the first.” However, when a statute clashes with the Constitu-
tion, the order must be reversed and the “converse of that rule” adopted. 
“The nature and reason of the thing” require that “the prior act of a superior 
ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate 
authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes 
the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the 
latter and disregard the former.” These manifest differences between statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation suggest that the commonality Manning 
prefers can only be achieved if judicial review is abolished and legislation 
allowed to rule supreme. Only in the alternative Marshall long ago rejected 
can Manning’s theory prevail.  
Marshall succinctly refutes Manning’s commonality claim by asserting 
that either “the [C]onstitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, 
that the legislature may alter the [C]onstitution by an ordinary act.” Fur-
thermore, Marshall maintains that “[b]etween these alternatives there is no 
middle ground.” If the Constitution “is on a level with ordinary legislative 
acts,” then “like other acts, [it] is alterable when the legislature shall please 
to alter it.” If this is true, then legislative power is inherently “illimitable,” 
and “written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to 
limit [legislative power].” So long as the road block of judicial review—
divorced from positive law and exclusively attributable to “the essence of 
the judicial duty” in what Hamilton expressly characterizes as an “exercise 
of judicial discretion”—remains the operative mode of constitutional en-
forcement, Manning’s argument for literal constitutional construction must 
dead-end against it.  
                                                                                                                      
 7. Michael Halley, Thoughts on the Churn Law, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 132, 144 
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 8. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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While sharply critical of how the Court abstracts a freestanding federal-
ism “from specific provisions spread throughout the entire document,” 
Manning ignores the fact that Marshall followed an identical procedure in 
Marbury. Marshall builds the general framework of judicial review from 
specific provisions that, he asserts, do not so much establish as “serve to 
illustrate this subject.” Or as Metzger describes the fabrication, “Marshall 
derived the power of judicial review from general understandings of the 
judicial function and the nature of a written constitution, along the way ref-
erencing the Supremacy, Arising Under, and Oath Clauses.” Manning 
criticizes the Court’s determination to ground its anticommandeering doc-
trine on the “general background value of ‘dual sovereignty.’ ” Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning in Printz v. United States,9 however, is entirely consistent 
with Marshall’s inference of judicial review. Such extrapolations provide the 
only juristic grounds for constitutional interpretation in America. If Man-
ning believes otherwise, he should take aim at the truth of judicial review 
rather than at its interpretive consequences.  
Manning’s failure to reconcile his criticism of Justice Scalia’s Printz 
opinion, which endorses a freestanding federalism, with his approval of Jus-
tice Scalia’s Boumediene dissent further detracts from his unified theory. 
While Manning is free to argue for an extension of textualism past the limits 
imposed by the Court’s most influential, articulate, and nuanced textualist, 
he should not do so without endeavoring first to understand and to explain 
why all the Court’s most conservative Justices have consistently declined to 
take the obvious next step Manning proposes. Absent this undertaking, 
Manning’s method amounts to little more than ad hoc cherry-picking of 
convenient cases, which does nothing so much as underscore the differences 
between the various strains of judicial review that Manning seeks to bundle 
together.  
IV. Judicial Review’s Origins Lie in Freestanding Federalism 
The deficiency in Manning’s analysis becomes even clearer when one 
appreciates that the abstract federalism Manning rejects formed the basis 
from which Hamilton and Marshall first invented the expedient of judicial 
review. While dual sovereignty is all well and good, “[t]hirteen independent 
courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, 
is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confu-
sion can proceed,” says Hamilton in Federalist 80. Hamilton further asks 
“[w]hat, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State 
legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance 
of them?” This general assertion of jurisdiction cannot be credibly inter-
preted to encompass only the very few limitations that the Constitution 
expressly enumerates.10 And while Manning is confident that “the fact of 
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compromise” is sufficient to bind the states, he ignores the additional fact 
that Marshall grounded judicial review in the assumption that the states 
never bargained in good faith and cannot be trusted to keep their word. Ob-
serving in Cohens that “[w]e have no assurance that we shall be less divided 
than we have been,” Marshall relied on the same Founders’ background ex-
pectations that Manning eschews to conclude that:  
There is certainly nothing in the circumstances under which our Constitu-
tion was formed; nothing in the history of the times, which would justify 
the opinion that the confidence reposed in the States was so implicit as to 
leave in them and their tribunals the power of resisting or defeating, in the 
form of law, the legitimate measures of the Union. 
Hamilton and Marshall make it further abundantly clear that the infer-
ence of judicial review is preferable to any express constitutional 
enforcement provision. In Federalist 80, Hamilton asserts that either “a di-
rect negative on the State laws,” or “an authority in the federal courts to 
overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Un-
ion” will do the trick. He favors the latter because he presumes it will be 
“most agreeable to the states.” And while he goes on to say (in apparent 
justification) that this option “appears to have been thought by the conven-
tion preferable to the former,” he proffers no evidence to that effect. 
Marshall, for his part in Cohens, rests the practice of judicial review of state 
action on nothing more substantial than the fact that “[c]ourts of justice are 
the means most usually employed” to secure compliance with the laws, and 
that it is “reasonable to expect that a government should repose on its own 
Courts, rather than on others.” 
If Manning truly agrees with the Court that “[t]he principle of separation 
of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the 
Framers,”11 then he should follow that principle to its logical conclusion and 
reject judicial review of legislative or executive authority. However clearly 
the text of the Constitution may circumscribe the authority of the States, the 
President, and Congress, it contains nothing that affords the judicial branch 
a general power of superintendence and enforcement. 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).  
